Putting Petraeus in charge

Too Little? Too Late?

By Rick Horowitz

David Petraeus wrote the book on counterinsurgency. I figured the least I could do was read it.

So now, 200-plus densely packed pages later, I'm impressed. Impressed at the depth of thought that went into it. At the complexity of the tasks he identifies as essential. At the historical sweep of his examples, and his warnings. At the wide range of skills he knows our soldiers and marines can bring to the job.

And I'm depressed. Depressed at our chances of pulling it off.

The Bush administration has been riding the general -- his reputation, and his writings -- for all they're worth these past few weeks. "Doesn't he deserve a chance to succeed?" they ask. "How can you confirm him as our top man in Iraq," they demand of Congress, "and not support the strategy he's being sent to carry out?"

Fair questions -- if, in fact, it's his strategy, and not some pale imitation. And if, in fact, he'll be given the particular kinds of help he needs to carry it out.

That's where reading the manual -- the whole thing, not just some executive summary -- proves so sobering. Because his approach and his employers are such a terrible match.

What struck me again and again, poring over the general's observations and recommendations, was how his idea of a successful counterinsurgency was about so much more than additional soldiers firing additional weapons. (Not that he doesn't also need many more soldiers than he'll be getting.) What struck me was how high a premium Gen. Petraeus placed on qualities like: being nimble, being subtle. On detailed knowledge, not simply of the physical terrain, but of the social networks -- who has links with whom, who has influence over whom.

And even of the cultural considerations. What, for instance, do national "narratives" reveal about a society's core values? And how can those "narratives" be used to deny insurgents critical support among the target population?

That's how sophisticated a counterinsurgency effort can get when you're fighting for hearts and minds. I read the manual front to back, and it's clear how much Gen. Petraeus values nuance. Flexibility. Adaptability.

And then I follow his chain of command to its highest link, and there -- certain and stubborn and seeing the world in two colors only, black or white -- sits George W. Bush. Call me dubious.

* "The side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly -- the better learning organization -- usually wins," the general writes.

The fact that it took this administration's leading lights nearly four years just to get to a plan like this tells me how adaptable they are. How long did it take them even to acknowledge that there was an insurgency? (They still can't admit to a civil war, even as the situation spirals far beyond civil war.)

* Insurgents "do not use terrorist and guerrilla tactics because they are cowards afraid of a 'fair fight,'" the general writes. "Insurgents use these tactics because they are the best means available to achieve the insurgency's goals."

This administration would have to come up with a whole new vocabulary.

* "Understand what motivates the people and how to mobilize them," the general writes. "Knowing why and how the insurgents are getting followers is essential. This requires knowing the real enemy, not a cardboard cutout."

The general is working for a commander in chief whose subtle and nuanced analysis of the world includes: "They hate our freedom."

Good luck.

Posted 2/8/07. Tell your friends about the award-winning commentary at "Rick's"!

Rick Horowitz is a syndicated columnist, TV commentator, writing coach and public speaker.

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